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MONSTER VIOLENCE IN THE BOOK OF JOB
Brian R. Doak
George Fox University

Abstract: In this paper, I explore the book of Job in terms of the symbolic and
ideological warfare waged between God and the human protagonist, Job. Specifically, I argue that the invocation of various kinds of creatures under the “monster”
rubric (such as Leviathan, Rahab, Yamm, the Twisting Serpent, and Behemoth)
can be illuminated through a consideration of contemporary work—in the history
of religions, literary theory, and film studies—that categorizes the monstrous in
terms of ecological disorientation, metaphors of the torn human body, and the
boundaries of the “home.” Moreover, I draw on the work of Marie Hélène Huet
in her book Monstrous Imagination to argue that some of God’s showcase animals
in Job 38–41 (most prominently Behemoth and Leviathan, but also others) should
be discussed as monsters with reference to their ambiguous species representation
and their “false resemblance” to other known creatures. When considered within
the context of Job’s pervasive themes of geological and animal violence, Joban
monsters take their place among the menagerie of creatures adduced by Job’s
speaking characters as rhetorical gestures of disorientation, community redemption, and the meaning of small community experience within empire.
Key Words: Book of Job; Monsters; Monsters and Religion; Leviathan; Behemoth

D

espite the fact that Job contains more monsters, and more different
kinds of monsters, than any other single book in the Hebrew Bible
outside of Daniel,1 very few have yet ventured into an analysis of what role
these creatures as a group play for the Joban narrative and why they seem
to be mentioned so often in this book in particular. Is there a peculiar kind
In Daniel, see esp. chs. 7–12, and in the Christian New Testament, see the book of
Revelation, which features many monstrous figures. For recent and explicit discussion
of the Bible with reference to monsters, see, e.g., Timothy K. Beal, Religion and Its
Monsters, esp. 16–33; and Christopher A. Frilingos, Spectacles of Empire: Monsters,
Martyrs, and the Book of Revelation.
1

of violence in Job that can be rightly called “monster violence”? Should the
violence of the monster be experienced, theorized or understood differently
from other kinds of violence? And what does the Joban monster, in particular,
tell us about the role of the book of Job as it represents (a) an alterior version
of “wisdom” within the Hebrew Bible as well as (b) Job’s own experience of
alteriority in the face of his human friends and the monster.2
In this essay I want to investigate these Joban creatures under the “monster” rubric—I have in mind the Leviathan, Rahab, Yamm, the Twisting
Serpent, and Behemoth—and explore how they could be illuminated through
a consideration of contemporary work in the history of religions, literary
theory, and film studies that categorizes the monstrous in terms of ecological
disorientation, metaphors of the torn human body, and the boundaries of the
“home.”3 At the present moment, my goal is not so much to latch on to any
one monster theory or definition as though it can provide a magic key to unlocking some mystery of the Joban drama. For the purposes of brevity in this
article, I will focus on the identity of the monsters in the Divine Speech (Job
38–41) by invoking the work of Marie Hélène Huet in her book Monstrous
Imagination to argue that some of God’s showcase animals in Job 38–41
should be discussed as monsters with reference to their ambiguous species
representation and their “false resemblance” to other known creatures.4 I will
then conclude by making a preliminary suggestion about how the monster
can be read in Job’s first context of reception as a “cognitive shock” in what
the anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse calls the “imagistic mode” of religion.

I want to thank the organizers of the American Academic of Religion panel in which
a version of this essay was first presented (Comparative Approaches to Religion and
Violence Group) in San Diego (November 2014), and especially Margo Kitts for her
response during that session and encouragement. Elements of this paper appeared earlier
in my book Consider Leviathan: Narratives of Nature and the Self in Job (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2014), and I am grateful to Fortress Press for allowing me to reproduce
parts of that study here. Though my focus in that work was not on the category of the
monster or violence as such, readers should consult Consider Leviathan for my extended
treatment of various themes treated here in this essay.
3
Recent research has produced a torrent of critical works on the monster, some trending toward popular audiences, others thick with academic jargon, and some appealing to
both popular and scholarly audiences simultaneously; in addition to the sources discussed
below, see, e.g., Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, ed., Monster Theory: Reading Culture; Marina
Levina and Diem-My T. Bui, eds., Monster Culture in the 21st Century: A Reader; Joshua
David Bellin, Framing Monsters: Fantasy Film and Social Alienation; W. Scott Poole,
Monsters in America: Our Historical Obsession with the Hideous and the Haunting;
David J. Skal, The Monster Show: A Cultural History of Horror.
4
Marie Hélène Huet, Monstrous Imagination.
2

Recent theorists have defined the monster in predictably varied and
sophisticated ways, drawing on chronologically diverse material from the
ancient world, the medieval period, and contemporary film, fiction, politics,
and visual art of all kinds.5 To choose one strand of discussion convenient
for some points I want to make later in this essay, many monster definitions
treat these figures as fundamentally combinations, as hybrids or boundary
crossers.
For example, the German art historian Heinz Mode defines “monster”
as “a new shape resulting from a combination—usually in visual form, but
sometimes only in words—of characteristic components of properties of different kinds of living things or natural objects. It is therefore characteristic of
the ‘monster’ that it does not occur in nature, but belongs solely to the realm
of the human imagination, and also that its shape forms an organic entity, a
new type capable of life in art and in the imagination.”6 In his notable book
The Philosophy of Horror, Noël Carroll similarly invokes the idea of combination when he writes that “one structure for the composition of horrific
beings is fusion. On the simplest physical level, this often entails the construction of creatures that transgress categorical distinctions such as inside/
outside, living/dead, insect/human, flesh/machine, and so on. . . . A fusion
figure is a composite that unites attributes held to be categorically distinct
and/or at odds in the cultural scheme of things in unambiguously one, spatiotemporally discrete entity.”7 Again invoking the monster in these terms, in the
introduction to her new edited volume The Bible and Posthumanism Jennifer
Koosed argues that, despite the fact that “the Bible begins as a speciesist manifesto—only humanity is created in the image of the divine, only humanity is
given dominion over the rest of creation . . . the Bible also contains multiple
moments of disruption, boundary crossing, and category confusion: animals
speak, God becomes man, spirits haunt the living, and monsters confound at
the end.” The categories serve not only to create new creaturely definitions,
but also, as Koosed notes, such stories “destabilize the very category of the
human.”8 The monster is therefore never an object of horror in isolation, and
never self-contained, but always gesturing back toward the definition of the
human, threatening human safety and thus defining the limits of the human.
5
The following is drawn from the excellent review in David D. Gilmore, Monsters:
Evil Beings, Mythical Beasts, and All Manner of Imaginary Terrors, 1–22.
6
Heinz A. Mode, Fabulous Beasts and Demons, 7 (with discussion in Gilmore,
Monsters, 8).
7
Noël Carroll, A Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart, 43 (with discussion
in Gilmore, Monsters, 9).
8
Jennifer L. Koosed, “Humanity at Its Limits,” 3.

A GLANCE AT THE MONSTER IN JOB CHAPTERS 1–37

The book of Job opens with an iconic description of one man, Job, whose life
is conspicuously un-haunted by monsters of any kind. Indeed, the creatures
narrated there in the book’s first chapter—sheep, camels, oxen, and donkeys—
are distinctly subservient, faceless, and nameless, very much on par in this
respect with Job’s children, slaves, and wife. On the terms of ambiguity of
identity and boundary crossing, the figure of the satan (Hebrew haśśāṭān,
traditionally translated “Satan” but clearly not the pitchfork-wielding king of
hell in the Christian tradition), who enters the storyline to question the motives
of Job’s righteousness, has evaded a precise categorization as either human
or divine—he is clearly not a human, but he functions and speaks like a human and he is not clearly a divine being on the same level as Job’s antagonist
God—with most interpreters resting content to call him an Adversary.
The effects of the infamous heavenly duel between the satan and the Lord
certainly do turn Job into something other than his normal self; robbed of all
possessions and losing his children, Job becomes bodily disfigured, pushing
him beyond the boundary of his home and nearer a monstrous geographical
domain—outside of domestic space. Through his curses, “Let the day on
which I was born perish” (3:3) and “let there be darkness” (3:4), Job attempts
to reverse or break the calendar insofar as his birth had introduced him into
the cycle of life and time, hoping to throw nature’s goodness as well as its
brutality into an abyss. Gloom and clouds and dark days are the metaphors
here (3:5); blackness is the void out of which no green plant will grow. The
sun will not shine on the earth, for now there is no sun, and nurturing domestic animals will not creep about on that earth, grazing on its produce. No
rejoicing can be found here, no joy-shouts (3:7). Though we are left without
plants, what we are left with, in Job’s cursed, dismal world, is an animal:
Leviathan (liwyātān, 3:8). Indeed, two monsters already figure prominently
in Job’s initial lament. For the moment, let us be content to identify this first
creature, Leviathan, as something chaotic and awful, to be considered on
parallel with another sea monster, Yamm (Job 3:8–9):
May those who curse Yamm curse it [ = the day of Job’s birth],
those skilled to call up Leviathan . . . 9

In the Ugaritic Baal epic, Yamm is a malevolent deity who stands in opposition to the warrior god Baal’s attempts to establish an orderly house for
9
Here I follow a common emendation, reading the MT’s ’ōrrê yôm, “day cursers,” as
’ōrrê yam, “Yamm cursers.” Even the concept of a “day curser” would of course make
sense here, since Job had been referring to the day of his birth in 3:1–7. All translations
from Hebrew to English in this essay are my own.

himself. Cursing plays a role in Baal’s engagement with Yamm, as the weapons forged for the warrior deity take their power from the oral incantation
of their names: Yagrušu, “drive out,” and ‘Ayyamurru, “expel.”10 Later in the
story, a creature named Lôtan, etymologically and mythically equivalent to
the biblical Leviathan,11 appears in a context of battle:
When you [ = Baal] smite Lôtan, the fleeing serpent,
finish off the twisting serpent,
the close-coiling one with seven heads . . . 12

Job’s imagery in 3:8–9 thus evokes sinister magic and violence. Through
these creation-reversing curses, Job has journeyed deeply into the pre-creation
desert—a place which Gen 1:2 calls tōhû wābōhû, “barren and unlivable”13—
and, as we see later in the book, he can be reintroduced back only into a
different kind of world.
Much later in the dialogue between Job and his friends, the speaker in Job
26 turns to a creation scene that invokes the monster as a creation foil. Though
Job is explicitly made the speaker here in the traditional text, evidence of
manuscript corruption in chapters 25–27 generally provides enough warrant
for skepticism regarding the content of the words in chapter 26.14 Whatever
the case, Job had been the only one so far to speak of monstrous animals, and
Job the only one to invoke the word tōhû, a desert or void, to speak of God’s
moral universe (6:18, 12:24, and then again in 26:7, if this is Job). Thus, it
would not be completely unreasonable on thematic grounds to see him as the
speaker here again.15 Job 26:7–13 reads as follows:

See the edition of Dennis Pardee, “The Ba‘lu Myth,” 248–249, and some comment on
the role of the spoken curse as weapon in Seth L. Sanders, The Invention of Hebrew, 51–52.
11
See, e.g., Mark S. Smith, The Origins of Biblical Monotheism: Israel’s Polytheistic
Background and the Ugaritic Texts, 36–37.
12
Pardee, “Ba‘lu Myth,” 265.
13
For tōhû as desert and uninhabitable land, see Deut 32:10; Isa 34:11; 45:18; Jer
4:23; Ps 107:40; and Job 12:24 (discussed below).
14
In the traditional Jewish text of Job, the Masoretic Text, Job chapter 25 is a mere
six verses, the shortest chapter in the book and very notably shorter than any other single
speech in the book’s speech-cycle. This, combined with the content of the speech (which
may sound more like Eliphaz or another one of the friends), has led many interpreters
to posit textual corruption here. A popular solution is to ascribe the chapter to a speaker
other than Job. See extended comments and sources cited in Doak, Consider Leviathan,
159–166.
15
Also Kathryn Schifferdecker, Out of the Whirlwind: Creation Theology in the Book
of Job, 44–46. .
10

(7) He stretches out Zaphon upon the void [tōhû]
he hangs the earth upon nothing;
(8) he binds up the waters in his clouds,
and the cloud is not torn apart by them;
(9) he obscures the face of the full moon,16
and spreads his cloud over it;
(10) he decreed a circle upon the face of the waters,
at the limits of light and darkness;
(11) the pillars of the heavens tremble,
they are astounded at his rebuke;
(12) by his strength he stilled the Waters [hayyām],
and by his understanding he struck Rahab;
(13) by his breath he made the heavens beautiful,
his hand pierced the Fleeing Serpent [nāḥāš bārîaḥ] . . .

Job invokes the monster as a curse, or to give voice to the immense, divine
power marshaled against him—first in the form of a direct curse on his own
self, and later to affirm a creation story very unlike Genesis 1 in which there
is a narrative of ecological disorientation and violence against the monstrous
Waters, Rahab, and Fleeing Serpent.
THE MONSTROUS ANIMAL IN THE DIVINE SPEECH (JOB 38–41)

An outburst of contemporary philosophical work has now challenged the
“faceless,” subservient character of animals generally for contemporary
audiences, a move prefigured by God’s own zoological outburst featuring
powerful animals in Job 38–40.17 The animals of the divine speech are loaded
with pathos, strength, independence, arrogance, failure, and beauty—features
that place these creatures outside of human control, to be sure, but also features that identify nature’s drama with the predicament of human suffering.
What is it about Job’s problem, exactly, which calls for a long zoologically
oriented lecture from the deity? When Carl Jung refers to the animals of the
Divine Speech as a “prehistoric menagerie” in his famous Answer to Job, he
Following the common emendation here for kissē (“throne”), read as kēse’ (“full
moon”; see Prov 7:20; Ps 81:4), as in Marvin Pope, Job, 165.
17
See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, The Animal that Therefore I Am, esp. concerning the
question of “gaze” and animal anonymity; along similar lines, see Giorgio Agamben,
The Open: Man and Animal; Matthew Calarco, Zoographies: The Question of the Animal
from Derrida to Heidegger.
16

does so with some bewilderment at the divine tactic.18 The term “menagerie”
is really quite appropriate, however, invoking as it does eighteenth-century
notions of animal collections as a category of exotic prestige, a collective
practice already known within the ancient Mesopotamian world.19 The focus
on the curious, the uncontrollable, and the abnormal is prominent; the speech
takes its readers into a reverse creation story, where, instead of chaos moving
toward order, God begins with order and measured space and presses outward
or downward into chaos and the monstrous.20
This movement has a corollary elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, where the
movement from city to wasteland is a trope of punishment (Ps 107:33–38; Isa
34:8–15; Hos 2:5, 14; Lam 2:8, 4:3); “characteristically eerie and uncanny
animals” live in these wastelands (Isa 13:19–21; 34:8–15; Jer 50:39–40;
Zeph 2:13–15), dallying in places distant from home.21 In a discussion of
“domesticated” animals versus “monsters” as they are associated with deities
in theriomorphic union, Mark Smith maps out an expected but insightful set
of correlations: “benevolent deities” are anthropomorphic, associated with
the domestic sphere, and take on emblems of bull, calf, bird, or cow, while
“destructive divinities” are themselves “animal gods” who inhabit undomesticated space (desert, wasteland). Proper deities inhabit “near places,”
while monsters and demons stand outside (note Azazel in Lev 16:8).22 In the
Ugaritic Baal cycle mentioned earlier, Baal’s climactic battles with Death
(Mot) occur in the wilderness; as Smith points out, “the outback [Ugaritic
dbr; compare with Hebrew midbār] marks a marginal or transitional zone
and the site of human activities such as grazing and hunting . . . here begins
the area of dangerous forces.”23
The danger associated with wild animals presents the heroic, benevolent
deity with an enemy to overcome. In a very widely known set of iconographic examples from the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean worlds,
the “master of animals” motif (for both male and female deities) indicates
divine domination over wildness.24 These depictions have a central figure
Carl Jung, Answer to Job, 19.
See Karen P. Foster, “The Earliest Zoos and Gardens,” 64–71 and Allison K. Thomason, Luxury and Legitimation: Royal Collecting in Ancient Mesopotamia.
20
William P. Brown, The Seven Pillars of Creation: The Bible, Science, and the Ecology of Wonder, 126.
21
Carol Newsom, The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 245.
22
Smith, Origins, 28–33; see also John B. Geyer, “Desolation and Cosmos,” 58–59.
23
Smith, Origins, 29.
24
See ample images and discussion in Othmar Keel, Jawhes Entgegnung an Ijob. Eine
Deutung von Ijob 38–41 vor dem Hintergrund der zeitgenössischen Bildkunst, 86–101.
18
19

grasping the throats or tails of animals on either side—typically a caprid
(wild goat-antelope), horse, scorpion, lion, or steppeland bird such as an
ostrich.25 In some examples, it is unclear as to whether the anthropomorphic
figure is “mastering” the animals or reaching out to them in some gesture
of veneration.26 In at least some cases, though, we know that this motif displayed a deity in association with a particular kind of animal—presumably
the animal served as a symbolic token of that deity’s presence (which could
be signaled even without the anthropomorphic figure in the depiction), or
the deity comes to conquer that which is wild in the animal itself (such as
cases with lions, crocodiles, or the ostrich). Either way, in this iconography
(whether visual or evoked by text) the deity and the animal cannot be separated; the deity’s association with the animal is a picture of the cosmos, that
is, of the ongoing status of divine control and the divine attributes needed to
achieve this control.27
God’s hymn to the “Leviathan” (liwyātān) and the “Behemoth” (bĕhēmôt)
constitute the crowning poetic achievement of the book of Job. The creatures
have received a massive amount of attention in the secondary literature, so
much that any adequate review in this space is, fortunately, impossible.28
Text critical and philological problems beyond the boundaries of what I can
address here abound as well.29 The last few decades of the twentieth century
See Othmar Keel and Christoph Uehlinger, Gods, Goddesses, and Images of God
in Ancient Israel, 141–152, 182–194.
26
Moreover, it is not always clear whether the anthropomorphic figure is a human or
deity (or something hybrid); see Keel and Uehlinger, Gods, 182, 184.
27
Keel, Jawhes Entgegnung an Ijob, 125.
28
For short and helpful overviews with bibliography on Leviathan, see Christoph
Uehlinger, “Leviathan,” 511–515; Edward Lipiński, “liwyāṯān,” 504–509; on Behemoth,
see, e.g., Bernard Couroyer, “Behemoth = hippopotamus ou buffle,” 214–222; Bernard
Batto, “Behemoth,” 165–169. One of the better summaries of opinions over the past few
centuries (up to 1975) is J. V. Kinnier Wilson, “A Return to the Problems of Behemoth
and Leviathan,” 1–24; other useful treatments include Norman Habel, The Book of Job,
548–561; David J. A. Clines, Job 38–42, 1141–1203; Keel, Jawhes Entgegnung an Ijob,
127–156, with ample iconographic comparisons; Michael V. Fox, “Behemoth and Leviathan,” 261–267; Abigail Pelham, Contested Creations in the Book of Job, 127–137;
David Wolfers, “The Lord’s Second Speech in the Book of Job,” 474–499; John Day,
God’s Conflict with the Dragon and the Sea: Echoes of Canaanite Myth in the Old Testament, 75–84; Robert Gordis, “Job and Ecology (and the Significance of Job 40:15),”
196–198; Robert Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation and Special
Studies, 467–490; Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Poetry, 132–138; Newsom, The Book
of Job, 234–258.
29
On this, see especially Wolfers, “The Lord’s Second Speech”; Gordis, Book of Job,
467–490; Pope, Job, 265–287; Édouard Dhorme, A Commentary on the Book of Job,
25

in particular saw an explosion of articles bent on identifying these creatures
as either “real” (a hippopotamus and crocodile, usually) or “mythological,”
as in the “Leviathan” Job invokes in 3:8 or the allusion to a creature like the
Ugaritic Lotan, smote by Baal.30 Indeed, the fact that Leviathan has already
appeared in Job in a mythological context means that readers of Job can
hardly first think of Leviathan as anything but a wild sea monster beyond
the bounds of anything that we would call a “real” animal today.31 However,
the fact that it is Job who spoke of Leviathan, combined with the fact that
much of the Divine Speech seems slanted against Job’s and/or the Friends’
arguments in sum, might suggest that we are to seek a subversive identity
for Leviathan in Job 41.
Almost every interpreter on the topic of these animals’ identities is now
quick to point out that ancient audiences would not have distinguished between “real” and “mythical” animals,32 though it is not clear whether we
mean that ancient people did not know or suspect that some creatures did not
in fact exist. Perhaps more accurately, ancient audiences had no resources
with which to know one way or the other whether remote, strange animals
did truly exist, and thus they were willing to engage in speculation about
non-obvious beings beyond what readers today could tolerate.33 Even the
iconic King James Bible—in its original 1611 version as well as updates in
the nineteenth century and in all (Old) King James Bibles today—mentions
unicorns about a dozen times, apparently prompted in at least some instances
by the Greek translation of rĕ’ēm (“wild ox”) by monókerōs (“single-horn”;
the Latin Vulgate has rinoceros), thus preserving the spirit of ancient animal
thinking (even if by erroneous translation).34 Other translations actively delete
“mythological” animal thinking where it may exist in the text, such as the
NIV 2011, which translates śārāp mĕ‘ôpēp, “flying serpent,” twice as “fiery
serpent” (Isa 14:29; 30:6; compare with Isa 6:2). Other animals, such as
616–644.
30
See Pardee, “Ba‘lu Myth,” 265.
31
A point also made by Habel, Book of Job, 560.
32
E.g., Rebecca S. Watson, Chaos Uncreated: A Reassessment of the Theme of “Chaos”
in the Hebrew Bible, 333; Fox, “Behemoth and Leviathan”; Alter, Art, 132.
33
Then again, a 2012 Angus Reid public opinion poll found that around one-third of
Americans believe in the existence of “Bigfoot,” a fact that would complicate an overly
strong dichotomy between ancient and modern humans on this front (http://www.angusreidglobal.com/polls/44419/americans-more-likely-to-believe-in-bigfoot-than-canadians/
[accessed 5 January 2014]).
34
In the KJV, see Num 23:22; 24:8; Deut 33:17; Job 39:9–10; Pss 22:21; 29:6; 92:10;
Isa 34:7.

Jonah’s “large fish,” dwell at some borderline between what, for an ancient
Israelite, is biologically feasible and a mysterious unknown realm of sea
creatures or desert predators.
Nothing about the Behemoth (40:15–24) needs to be read as particularly
non-realistic for a biological animal, leading most interpreters to identify the
creature as a hippopotamus, though the Leviathan (40:25–41:26)35 pushes
boundaries in at least two respects. First, Leviathan poses a threat to the
divine world. Pending a common emendation in 41:1(41:9), the text would
read “the gods were thrown down (or: dismayed) at its appearance,”36 though,
as it stands, the Hebrew ’el mar’âw yūtāl could be translated “at its appearance he was/will be thrown down,” the “he” being the fisherman alluded to
in 40:31–32(41:7–8). However, in 41:17(41:25) the ’ēlîm clearly react in
terror at the Leviathan: “at his majesty the deities (’ēlîm) are in fear, at his
crashing (mišĕbārîm) they are thrown amiss (yitḥaṭṭā’û).” In either or both
cases, Leviathan would be best imagined as a Sea Monster in opposition to
the divine world, such as in the Baal Epic, Enuma Elish, or any number of
references to the Chaoskampf in the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Ps 74:14; Isa 27:1).37
Second, Leviathan breathes fire in 41:11–13(41:19–21). Combined with the
characterization discussed above, the fire breathing pushes the animal still
further into a more monstrous realm.
One could excuse either of these references within the bounds of poetic
hyperbole, as the rest of the description fits reasonably with the common assertion that Leviathan here is a crocodile, or even a whale.38 Othmar Keel’s
iconographic analysis demonstrates the common occurrence of both hippopotamus and crocodile hunt scenes on Egyptian seals and tomb art, which itself
makes a reasonable suggestion that the poet saw these two animals as at least
inspiration for the grand examples in Job 40–41.39 The overall presentation

Hebrew and English verse numberings diverge at the Leviathan; Heb. continues the
chapter 40 verse numbering through 40:32, while the Engl. language tradition begins with
Leviathan in 41:1 (Heb. 40:25); each time I cite a Hebrew verse here, I give the English
reference in parentheses.
36
See the reasonable explanation of Pope, Job, 282.
37
Most interpreters (e.g., Newsom, Book of Job, 248) speak of these creatures in terms
of “chaos,” though cf. Watson, Chaos Uncreated, 366, who disputes this connection.
38
For the crocodile interpretation, see Keel, Jawhes Entgegnung an Ijob, 141–156,
and for the whale, see Fox, “Behemoth and Leviathan.”
39
Keel, Jawhes Entgegnung an Ijob, 127–141 on the hippo and 141–156 on the crocodile. See also Tryggve N. D. Mettinger, “The God of Job: Avenger, Tyrant, or Victor?” in
The Voice from the Whirlwind: Interpreting the Book of Job, 46, who compares the Joban
animals to animals and animal-deities in Egyptian mythology.
35

of these creatures reminds us that Israelites did not think in Linnaean terms,40
and thus words like “biology,” “myth,” and so on may prove unhelpful.
Perhaps the most productive approach to these animals, then, is to view
them as “monsters,” a type of non-human-animal in many cultures both ancient and modern. Biblical scholars have already made helpful forays into
the interpretation of these creatures as monsters, though usually not in any
closely defined sense. In a perceptive essay, Rebecca Raphael argues that the
monsters of Job show Job something about himself; monsters metaphorize
the torn human body, and reveal to Job what an invincible body would truly
look like (in response to what Job wished his body could be—strong as stones
or bronze [Job 6:11–12]).41 Timothy Beal injects his reading of monsters in
his Religion and Its Monsters with a range of comparative and theoretical
sophistication, and takes up a consideration of Behemoth and Leviathan on
these terms. Beal asserts that the Joban creatures here are “dangerous otherness within creation,” as God eventually “out-monsters” Job.42
Though etymologies of words are not always particularly relevant for
ongoing function, “monsters” live out their etymology in revealing ways:
“monster” apparently comes through the Old French monstre, from the Latin
montrer, “to show, reveal.”43 The monster demonstrates. The monster points
to otherness or fear of the viewer through its own body; zombies in film, e.g.,
are never only about a quick scare, but rather always gesture toward contemporary cultural notions of that which is perceived as foreign or invasive.44
This is not to say that the monstrous demonstration is straightforward. As
Marie Hélène Huet shows, monsters are “doubly deceptive,” in that their odd
appearance can be “a misleading likeness to another species.” Monsters can
present “similarities to categories of beings to which they are not related,”
but this can be “a false resemblance.”45
Few descriptions of this false resemblance would be better than William
Blake’s famous engraving of Behemoth and Leviathan in 1826 (first in black

As Scott C. Jones cogently argues with regard to lion and serpent imagery in “Lions,
Serpents, and Lion-Serpents in Job 28 and Beyond,” 663–686.
41
Rebecca Raphael, “Things Too Wonderful: A Disabled Reading of Job,” 415–421,
and also Alec Basson, “Just Skin and Bones: The Longing for Wholeness of the Body
in the Book of Job,” 287–299.
42
Beal, Religion and Its Monsters; quotes here from 50 and 48, 55, respectively.
43
See Robert Burch, “Frames of Visibility: Si(gh)ting the Monstrous,” 87–88; Huet,
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and white, but then colored by Blake himself).46 God directs Job and Friends
downward, to a revelation of a cosmos-in-miniature, as if to say: this is the
true nature of things. The Behemoth creature at the middle of Blake’s cosmos
certainly does resemble a biologically real hippopotamus, but something of
the face (especially the eyes, ears, and fangs), the back, and the coloring is
suggestively amiss—this is no ordinary animal, though it stands on human
ground, among the reeds mentioned in Job 40:21–22. On the lowest tier, the
coiling Leviathan comes forth as straightly mythological, representing watery depth as opposed to land. Blake’s image of the Behemoth in particular
takes us deeply into the feeling of the passage, and, I would argue, represents what the poet of Job 40–41 attempted to do in textual form with these
animals. Behemoth is a hippopotamus, and takes its point of departure from
the hippopotamus, but it is also more than a species that could be controlled
by definition. So too, Leviathan is a scaly, toothy reptile, a crocodile, but
then evokes more terror and dominance than a crocodile could show—even
demonstrating the power of chaos control and creative power that the Lord
God lords over Job.
MONSTERS IN THE CULT OF THE LITTLE COMMUNITY

Job had already considered his experience to be “monstrous” when he raised
the specter of Leviathan, Yamm, and others in his initial lament (Job 3). Why
does the Joban deity proceed to double-down on the power and violence of
the monster in the book’s climactic scene? I conclude the essay here with
a suggestion that involves appeal to Job’s socio-historical circumstances of
authorship and a cognitive-anthropological theory of religion championed
recently by Harvey Whitehouse. As far as I am aware, no one has yet attempted to apply Whitehouse’s ideas in this respect to a text as opposed to a
human community directly, and thus my effort to do so here is a preliminary
gesture toward what such an application might look like.47
First, the historical circumstance: Job was likely written or at least finalized
as a book in the sixth century BCE, perhaps even in the immediate aftermath
of Israel’s return from exile under the direction of the Persian empire.48 This
return was likely a difficult affair on a number of levels—the ecological dimensions of the resettlement of land during this time period is particularly
See William Blake, Illustrations to the Book of Job, online at http://www.
blakearchive.org/exist/blake/archive/work.xq?workid=but550 (accessed 6 January 2014).
47
I attempted this same application (in an extended manner) for these same materials
in Doak, Consider Leviathan, 277–286.
48
I argue for this point in detail elsewhere; see Doak, Consider Leviathan, 236–240,
and sources cited there.
46

intriguing, since archaeology tells us that the Babylonian destruction of
Israel/Palestine was truly devastating and recent excavation has begun to
suggest that what remained of Judah in the latter half of the sixth century was
small and impoverished.49 The history of Israel’s religion, so the scholarly
consensus goes, underwent great changes in this particular period, leading to
sometimes radically reconfigured understandings of the older, standard ideas
of covenant, the divine involvement in the Temple specifically, and the entire
religio-political system of the nation generally.
It is within this sketch of a context, then, that I wonder how the Joban
monsters might act as a foil to a certain kind of “natural religion” under
terms set out by recent neuro-scientific and anthropological research. In a
recent study, the psychologist Justin Barrett devotes quite a bit of attention
to the question of what he calls “natural theology,” dividing the concept into
two categories: universal natural theology, and confessional natural theology. Natural theology of the so-called “universal” type relies on information
that “all rational people universally would be inclined to accept,” whereas
“confessional” natural theology begins by assuming a particular confessional
starting point.50 This confessional version does not start from the ground up,
but rather seeks to “augment, disambiguate, and amplify” previous convictions by appeal to science or nature directly.51
Drawing on his study of “content-specific cognitive systems,” that is,
those cognitive systems “responsible for [among other things] reasoning
about the properties and movement of physical objects” and “living things,”
Barrett suggests a tentative list of “assumptions” or “nonreflective beliefs”
characteristic of “natural religion”: “Elements of the natural world such as
rocks, trees, mountains, and animals are purposefully and intentionally designed by someone(s)”; “Things happen in the world that unseen agents cause.
These agents are not human or animal”; “Humans have internal components
(such as a mind, soul, and/or spirit) that are distinguishable from the body”;
“Moral norms are unchangeable (even by gods)”; “Immoral behavior leads
to misfortune; moral behavior to fortune”; “Gods can and do interact with
the natural world and people”; “Gods generally know things that humans do
not”; “Gods . . . may be responsible for instances of fortune or misfortune;

See, e.g., Lester L. Grabbe, A History of the Jews and Judaism in the Second Temple
Period, Volume 1, Yehud: A History of the Persian Province of Judah, 197–207 on the
economy, population, and archaeology of the period in question.
50
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they can reward or punish human actions”; “Because of their superhuman
power, when gods act, they act permanently.”52
Such views may be described as “cognitively optimal”;53 they work together, and make sense as a system. Notably, however, various actors in Job
(particularly Job himself, and even God) pointedly resist some of these core
assumptions of “natural religion”; they are heretics, out of step with key
components of natural religion. These characters are theologically incorrect, to adapt the title D. Jason Sloan’s book Theological Incorrectness: Why
Religious People Believe What They Shouldn’t.54 In Job, the natural world is
certainly designed by God, and unseen agents drive events, but it is not clear
that anyone in Job believes that humans have a mind/soul/spirit apart from
their bodies; moral norms seem malleable; and, most strikingly, behavior does
not straightforwardly predict outcome in the book’s central case study. Indeed,
as Barrett points out, “natural religion” can become “specified, amplified, or
even contradicted in particular cultural settings—what we often call theology—not unlike how we learn the particulars of our native language.” Even
so, intense effort is required for those who wish to affirm theology outside
the bounds of this construct of “natural religion.” “Cultural scaffolding” must
appear, to buttress and reinforce counterintuitive ideas.55
The anthropologist Harvey Whitehouse has discussed the varying ways a
religious group can inculcate and reinforce “cognitively costly religion,” that
is, religion that runs hard against the grain of the types of beliefs Barrett described as “natural religion.”56 Whitehouse contends that many religions have
within them two distinct (and even openly competing) “modes” of religious
expression: the “doctrinal” and “imagistic” modes of religiosity.”57 In the
Barrett, Cognitive Science, 130–133. In what follows, I have abridged Barrett’s list
of beliefs included under the category of “natural religion” at 132–133.
53
See Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious
Transmission, 29–47.
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136–38) describes a series of experiments he and others have conducted which show that
individuals will consistently mis-remember, distort, omit, or invent elements of a religious
story so as to skew ambiguous elements in that story toward a “theologically correct”
(i.e., in accordance with “natural religion”) understanding.
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57
As Whitehouse himself points out, previous investigations have revealed partly
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“doctrinal mode,” often associated with “literati” and “social élites,” religious
knowledge is “codified as a body of doctrines,” expressed through routine
worship, accepted as “general knowledge,” and meant to produce “anonymous
communities.”58 Doctrinal mode communities are diffuse, and persuasion in
this mode comes through the forms of universal, verbalized creeds, intellectual
persuasion, and through highlighting ideas linked by implicational logic.59
The “imagistic mode,” on the other hand, represents “little traditions,”
or “cults of the little community.” 60 Imagistic messages rely on terror, pain,
and initiation; they evoke “multivocal iconic imagery” meant to produce
“cognitive shocks.”61 In extreme (and ethnographically documented) cases,
imagistic rituals can involve extended trance states, cannibalism, and ritual
murder. Emotions run very high; imagistic ritual produces intense arousal
and expressions are infrequent (as opposed to the constant, measured nature
of doctrinal mode expression). The sum effect of such a system is a body
of what Whitehouse characterizes as “elaborate, if idiosyncratic, exegetical
knowledge,” and its attendant images “evoke abundant inferences, producing
a sense of multivalence and multivocality of religious imagery, experienced
as personal and unmediated inspiration.”62 The style of religion acquired
through the imagistic approach is “cognitively costly religion,” unintuitive,
flouting the cognitively optimal views passed on through human biology and
straightforward, everyday observation of the world.
This basic distinction between doctrinal and imagistic modes of religious
communication should be familiar to readers of the book of Job: Job’s friends
infamously rely on doctrinal strategies, such as the righteousness and reward
scheme encoded in Proverbs and elsewhere to convince Job of his guilt (e.g.,
Prov 1:32–33; 10:3–4; 11:31; 12:11; 26:27; compare with Exod 23:22–26;
“Apollonian” and “Dionysian” modes; Jack Goody’s split between “literate” and “nonliterate” religions; etc. See Modes of Religiosity, 63.
58
Whitehouse, Arguments and Icons, 1.
59
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Whole and Richard P. Werbner, ed., Regional Cults.
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Whitehouse, Modes of Religiosity, 70, 72, 77. Whitehouse avers that this imagistic
mode takes historical precedent over the doctrinal, based partly on “archaeological and
historical evidence,” though he seems not to consider the question of preservation bias—
extreme, elaborate, or bizarre rituals may appear more prominently in material culture as
well as in historical recollection, as opposed to frequent, routinized, verbal interactions.

Deut 28:1–4, 15–19, etc.), while the Divine response to Job (in tandem with
hints earlier in the book) suggests something more along the lines of the
imagistic mode. Thus, Whitehouse’s research could be used to breathe new
terminological life into the framing of the Joban monster drama. The Joban
monsters form an intricate textual icon of terror, a bold, imagistic attempt
to freeze a moment in time where memory should remain fixated. They attempt to teach their audience through trauma—an audience watches Job as a
participant in an imagistic textual ritual, where the monster marks a moment
of historical change for a struggling community, pointing them toward a new
future, away from traditional (doctrinal) modes of retribution thinking and
into other, more “counterintuitive” worlds.63
What might this new future entail? In brief, it is a future in which the
restructured Judahite “little community” had to carve out a new place amid
other small regional groups in the shadow of the Persian empire during the
sixth–fourth centuries BCE. Taking a cue from David Wolfers,64 we can read
creatures like Behemoth and Leviathan as ciphers for Empire—the monster
embodies a new conqueror, more powerful and strange than any other before.
Job, too, must carve out his own place among these monsters, and indeed he
does, receiving back what had been lost by the end of the book (Job 42). The
empire is amoral, like Behemoth in Job 40, and represents raw power and indifference to human concerns in the local community. By casting Israel’s God
as “zookeeper” of these monsters, the author of Job still asserts divine control
over the historical situation and over the empire, even as the monster, in all
its power, leaves readers with a threatening and ultimately ambiguous image.
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